ABSTRACT With the popularity of smartphones and widespread use of high-speed Internet, social media has become a vital part of people's daily life. Currently, text messages are used in many applications, such as mobile chatting, mobile banking, and mobile commerce. However, when we send a text message via short message service (SMS) or social media, the information contained in the text message transmits as a plain text, which exposes it to attacks. In some cases, this information may be confidential, such as banking credentials, secret missions, and confidential appointments; moreover, it is a major drawback to send such information via SMS or social media, as neither provides security before transmission. In this paper, we propose a novel text steganography technique called AITSteg, which provides end-to-end security during the transmission of text messages via SMS or social media between end users. The AITSteg technique is evaluated by considering a trusted scenario. We then evaluate the efficiency of the proposed technique in terms of embedding capacity, invisibility, robustness, and security. The experiments confirm that the AITSteg is able to prevent various attacks, including man-in-the-middle attacks, message disclosure, and manipulation by readers. Moreover, we compare the experimental results with the existing techniques to show the superiority of the proposed technique. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first text steganography technique that provides end-to-end secure transmission of the text message using symmetric keys via social media.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth in Internet and smartphone use has had a major social and commercial impact on daily life. These new technologies benefit people all over the world, and allow information to be stored, processed, and accessed in an inexpensive and widely accessible manner. Since the text message has become a popular and easy form of communication, concerns about data leakage attacks, such as hacking, hijacking, and phishing, have emerged. Users such as detectives, journalists, judges, and election officials rely on short message service (SMS) or Social Media Applications (SMAPP) to communicate with each other [1] - [3] . Smartphone users typically send confidential information such as banking credentials (e.g., account details, passwords, and transaction information), secret missions, confidential appointments, and private identities to family members via text messages using SMS or SMAPPs. However, the standard SMS service and social media amazingly do not provide security to this type of VOLUME 6, 2018 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ digital data being transmitted over networks. In this case, it is required to provide secure communication between smartphone users. Since text messages via SMS and SMAPPs on smartphones are so common, cyber-attacks such as man-inthe-middle (MITM) [3] , message disclosure [4] , and manipulation by readers (MBR) [2] are a concern. Functionally, text messages are sent as plaintext between smartphone users and service providers (the SMS service center, social media service provider, etc.) using an available network. Text message content is stored by service providers in servers that are easily accessed. Over the last two decades, many techniques have been proposed to improve the efficiency of text steganography in digital texts [6] - [12] , but these methods have low embedding capacity and low robustness against distortion attacks. In other words, they are not able to embed a high capacity of secret information through a short message.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
• First, we state three types of cyber-attacks that have recently brought a whole new dimension to cyberspace. In addition, we investigate how to address these attacks.
• Second, we propose a novel text steganography technique called AITSteg, which ensures the security of the message during transmission via SMS or SMAPPs. The AITSteg protects confidential information by generating a hidden message (HM) containing the confidential information and encoding it using a formulated symmetric key. Afterward, it embeds the generated HM in front of a seemingly innocent cover message (CM), which is used as a cover.
• Finally, we develop an app based on the AITSteg technique and conduct practical experiments to evaluate it by employing fifteen social media and messenger apps as communication channels. Examples are used to analyze and compare the proposed technique with existing techniques based on common criteria. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some background information and related works on text steganography. Section III presents the proposed technique in detail. Section IV describes the experimental results of the proposed technique conducted on SMAPPs and compares them with existing techniques. Section V presents a formal proof of the AITSteg technique. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with a summary of research contributions and future work.
II. RELATED STUDIES
This section surveys various studies and related works on text steganography. First, a brief description of cryptography and information hiding, the Unicode standard, and the evaluation criteria is provided, and then text steganography techniques from the literature are described. Table 1 represents the definition of various symbols used in the paper.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND INFORMATION HIDING
Secure communication techniques can be classified into two main branches, cryptography and information hiding. Generally, cryptography scrambles a plain text (or secret text) into cipher text that is reversible without data loss. The goal of cryptography is to prevent unauthorized access to the secret message (SM) by scrambling the original form of its content. On the other hand, information hiding is a powerful programming technique that hides an SM under cover of an innocent media (e.g., text, image, video and audio or other supports such as network communications) for the purpose of secure communication [6] , [9] , copyright protection [7] , tracking [8] , etc. This technique is divided into two major types, steganography and watermarking. Both offer a variety of methods to hide information in the cover media in an invisible or irremovable way, where the hidden information is reversible by the corresponding technique. Steganography is the technique of hiding an SM in a cover media to transmit the SM; therefore, the main concern is how to conceal it without raising the suspicion of human vision systems. Watermarking is concerned with hiding information in cover media such that the hidden data are robust to alterations and adjustments. Practically, steganography and cryptography are two techniques of secure transmission over the Internet. Cryptography scrambles a message to conceal its contents; steganography conceals the existence of an SM. However, cryptography provides optimum security for communication systems but has a fundamental flaw in that it raises the suspicions of attackers. However, when information hiding is used, even if an attacker is suspicious of the transmitted messages, he cannot discover the existence of hidden messages since it is carried out in an invisible way. The main limitation of cryptography is that the third party is always aware of the communication because of the unknown nature of the text. Steganography overcomes this limitation by hiding the existence of the SM in the cover media [5] - [10] . 
B. THE UNICODE STANDARD
In computing systems, the Unicode standard was defined in 1987 to process and display digital texts. Basically, all software systems have to support the Unicode standard for the representation of digital texts. The Unicode standard is a universal character encoding system designed to support the worldwide display, processing, and interchange of texts with different languages and technical disciplines. In addition, it also supports classical and historical characters of many languages. This standard is compatible with the latest version of ISO/IEC 10646-1:2017 and has the same characters and codes as those in ISO/IEC 10646. As of June 2017, the latest version of Unicode is 10.0.0, and it is maintained by the Unicode Consortium. It includes three encoding forms, UTF-8, UTF-16, and UTF-32, for which Unicode allows 17 planes, each with 65,536 possible characters (or 'code points'). Thus, it gives a total of 1,114,112 possible characters in formats such as digits, letters, symbols, emoticons, and a huge number of current characters in various languages. Currently, the most commonly used encoding forms are UTF-8, UTF-16 and the now outdated UCS-2. UTF-8 provides one byte for any ASCII character, which have the same code values in both ASCII and UTF-8 encoding, and up to four bytes for other characters. UCS-2 provides a 16-bit code unit (two 8-bit) for each character but cannot encode every character in the current Unicode standard. UTF-16 extends UCS-2, using one 16-bit unit for the characters that were representable in UCS-2 and two 16-bit units (4 × 8-bit) to process each of the further characters [5] .
These days, Unicode is required in new Internet protocols (e.g., TCP/IP, FTP, HTTP, and SMTP) and implemented in all modern operating systems (e.g., Android, iOS, Windows Phone and BlackBerry) and programming languages for processing digital texts. In Unicode, there are specific zero-width characters (ZWC) that are used to control special entities such as Zero Width Non Joiner (e.g., ZWNJ separates two letters in special languages) and POP directional, which have no written symbol or width in digital text [5] - [9] . In social media, if it utilizes the Unicode standard in order to process digital texts in different languages, then the ZWCs show invisible written symbols; otherwise, they might generate unconventional symbols [10] . We used four ZWCs for hiding the SM through the CM, which are depicted in Table 2 .
C. TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY EVALUATION CRITERIA
There are many considerations that must be taken into account when researchers design a text steganography algorithm. However, the common criteria can be easily found in recently proposed techniques: invisibility, embedding capacity, robustness, and security [5] - [12] .
1) INVISIBILITY OR IMPERCEPTIBILITY
The trace of a hidden SM in the CM HM must be invisible and avoid raising the suspicions of human vision system. In other words, invisibility refers to how much perceptual alterations are made in the CM HM after embedding an SM. Practically, it cannot be measured numerically. The best way of measuring the degree of imperceptibility is to compare the variation of CM and CM HM before and after embedding the HM [5] , [6] .
2) EMBEDDING CAPACITY(EC)
The amount of secret bits that can be embedded in a CM is termed the embedding capacity. This feature can be measured numerically in units of bit-per-locations (BPL). Locations are the number of embeddable locations (EL) in the CM where the method can insert the HM between words, after special characters, etc. However, a steganography algorithm provides a large embedding capacity, it is not useful if it alters the CM profoundly [5] , [8] .
3) ROBUSTNESS
In general, many attacks may occur on the CM HM while it is transmitted on the communication channels where it may be exposed to a hazard that could destroy the HM [5] . Moreover, malicious users may try to manipulate the HM from the CM HM rather than remove it. Thus, any kind of distortion might occur deliberately or even unintentionally on the CM HM . A robust steganography algorithm makes the HM extremely difficult to alter or destroy. It can also be measured numerically based on losing probability (LP) [6] - [8] . It is assumed that LP is the probability of how much proportion of the embedded secret bits has been lost from the CM HM . The lower losing probability leads to a more robust steganography algorithm. Let's assume that the number of embeddable locations in the CM is NL, the length of the CM is stand as TC, and then the distortion robustness (DR) can be calculated as follows.
where 1 < NL < TC, NL ∈ N, TC ∈ N.
There is a certain level of safety that prevents attackers from detecting the HM visually or from removing it from the CM HM [5] . This measure depends on three other criteria, invisibility, embedding capacity, and robustness. An efficient steganography technique must provide optimum balance among these criteria. If an algorithm provides a large EC, the trace of embedding the SM is totally invisible, and VOLUME 6, 2018 robustness is high, then the security of the algorithm is equal to the following formula.
• Hash Function is a mathematical method that maps data of arbitrary size to a binary string of a fixed length that is designed to be a one-way function, that is, a function that it is infeasible to invert. It can be employed to protect the secret bits before embedding in the cover media. In practice, it alters the sequence of the secret bits such that they can only be extracted by the corresponding hash function [6] . In other words, this technique makes the secret bits difficult to discover via decoding attacks.
• Decoding Probability (DP) is the probability of decoding the SM binary string from the CM HM by attackers [9] . It is assumed that, an attacker speculates a message may include an HM (e.g., he/she does not have any clue about the approach that is employed to conceal the SM). In addition, the attacker may try to decode the SM using conventional approaches or guessing the SM binary (using probability distribution analysis) from the invisible symbols or features. Since a hash function is used to map the SM binary (or secret bits) based on a key, and NS is the length of the SM binary, the DP can be calculated as follows.
Previously, various researchers have introduced several approaches to provide secure transmission of confidential information using data hiding in cover media. Most of the existing literature has focused on data hiding under cover of images, videos, and audios [12] - [17] ; however, relatively few techniques have been proposed to hide confidential information in the cover text. Recently, text hiding, where secret information is embedded in the cover text, has drawn considerable interest from security researchers. Since text messages have a limited number of words and symbols, it is difficult to change the text content to hide data through the short cover text. Basically, text messages include handwritten styles such as special phrases, short-hand acronyms, and emoticons [11] , [12] . A text-based data hiding technique called UniSpaCh is presented in [7] , which generates a binary string of the SM and isolates it by 2-bit classification (i.e., ''10, 01, 00, and 11''). Moreover, it replaces each 2-bit by a special space (e.g., Thin, Hair, Six-Per-Em, and Punctuation). Finally, it embeds the generated spaces into special locations such as inter-words, inter-sentences, end-of-lines, and interparagraphs within the cover text. However, this approach provides high invisibility through the cover text but has low embedding capacity (two bits per spaces) and is not applicable to embedding long secret bits in short cover text. A new algorithm of text steganography called AH4S is introduced in [9] , which applies the structure of the omega network to hide an SM in a generated CM. It selects a letter from the SM and uses the omega network to produce two related letters according to a selected letter and, moreover, searches the dictionary for a proper English cover word to conceal the two produced letters and repeats the same process for all letters of the SM. For example, to hide ''A'', it generates a long unknown text as a CM according to ''A'', and then, it embeds two width-spaces through the generated cover text to hide the positions of the two generated letters through the CM. In practice, it produces a long unknown text for a short SM and raises suspicions for the readers as well. An efficient text watermarking technique (TWSM) for hiding secret data in short Latin based text is proposed in [10] , which employs the homoglyph Unicode characters and special spaces in order to embed the secret bits in the Latin based CM. Based on the experimental results, it can be concluded that this technique provides optimum embedding capacity, high invisibility, and low robustness against distortion attacks. Sometimes, smartphone users employ emoticons in daily conversations instead of typing their feelings. Several researchers have utilized emoticons to hide an SM through the text message. For example, [11] , and [12] generate a random text including some words as a CM, and in addition, they convert all characters of the SM to emoticons based on a predefined pattern (e.g., A=''angry'', B=''sad'', C=''happy'', etc.) and, thus, embed emoticons between words in the CM. Although emoticonbased text steganography techniques have high invisibility, they suffer from low robustness against distortion attacks. In the techniques explained above, it is not clear whether the introduced approaches are able to prevent the SM against various attacks. Thus, in this paper, we compare the proposed technique with the existing UniSpaCh [7] , AH4S [9] , TWSM [10] , and emoticon-based [12] techniques. More information on traditional text steganography techniques can be found in [5] and [18] - [20] .
III. SECURITY GOALS AND PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
This section focuses on the attack model, motivating scenario and detail description of the proposed technique.
A. ATTACK MODEL
An attack model describes various scenarios for the possibilities of different attacks, where an attacker might be able to access/discover the authentic information.
1) MESSAGE DISCLOSURE AND OTA ATTACKS
Since the text message is transmitted as plain text, serviceprovider operators (SPO) can easily access the message content during the transmission over the network or from the database servers. This leads to message disclosure attacks. Moreover, in the case of the cellular networks, the OTA interface between the base transceiver station (BTS) and mobile station (user) is protected by a weak encryption technique (e.g., A5/1 or A5/2), so an attacker can easily decrypt these techniques to obtain the information contained in the SMS or manipulate message content or forge authentic messages [1] , [2] .
2) A MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM)
This is a type of hidden trick where an attacker inserts him/herself into a conversation between two parties, impersonates both parties, and gains access to information by processing and eavesdropping on the data transmission over the network. In the MITM attack, a common scenario consists of two victims (endpoints) and an attacker (third party). The attacker has access to the communication channel between two victims, and can manipulate their messages. The MITM attack can be visualized as depicted in Fig. 1 . This attack is very effective because of the property of the TCP and the HTTP protocol which are based on the ASCII or Unicode standard [1] , [3] , [21] .
3) MANIPULATION BY READER (MBR)
This is a serious attack, in which a malicious user has access to the victim's device and tries to discover confidential information from the SMAPPs, i.e., the victim's device is compromised by an attacker. The main aim of this attack is to gain sensitive information or manipulate messages in the victim's device on behalf of its owner [2] , [3] . For example, a malicious user can login to the account of another user in social media and monitor conversations.
B. MOTIVATING SCENARIO
To overcome the above stated attacks, we present a motivating scenario to demonstrate the research challenge of this paper. As depicted in Fig. 2 , we suppose that Alice and Bob are sensitive users working with a messenger (SMS, SMAPPs, etc.) to communicate confidential information during an important mission. The problem is that the MITM attacker is eavesdropping on the data transmission to gain access to sensitive information. In the same trend, the SPO has access to the transmitted messages where they are stored in the database servers of service providers. Furthermore, it is obvious that a safe conversation is required to guard against these attacks. To address this challenge, we propose a text steganography technique that ensures the security of confidential information while being transmitted via SMS or SMAPPs over the network.
Security measures require extra effort, and this is an additional cost borne by the smartphone user. Therefore, we develop an app based on the proposed technique that can be used by sensitive users to send confidential information via SMS or other SMAPPs. When a user wants to send an SM to another user, AITSteg is performed, which makes available a symmetric key between both users, and then the SM is hidden using a hash function. 
C. THE PROPOSED TECHNIQUE: AITSteg
As shown in Fig. 3 , the proposed technique has two main phases which are the embedding algorithm and extraction algorithm. Various elements of the proposed technique are explained in the following points.
• Secret Message (SM): This can be secret or confidential information.
• Cover Message (CM): This is an innocent text that can be any type of text message such as a greeting, a typical question, or a pranks.
• Key: This is used as a symmetric key (SK) while encoding/decoding the secret bits, which makes the SM difficult to discover (e.g., here, a formulated sending/receiving time is considered as the default SK).
• Embedding Algorithm: This converts the SM into a protected HM based on the SK and embeds it in front of the CM.
• Carrier Message (CM HM ) : This is the output message which includes the HM and CM.
• Extraction Algorithm: This extracts the HM from the CM HM , and decodes/authenticates the SM by checking the received SK.
• Message Sender (MS): This employs the embedding algorithm to send confidential information via SMS or other SMAPPs.
• Message Receiver (MR): This utilizes the extraction algorithm to authenticate and extract the confidential information from the CM HM .
Phase-1:
The embedding algorithm includes three stages: (1) generating pairs of numbers for all the letters of the SM, (2) producing a hashed binary string according to the pairs of numbers and the SK, (3) replacing the hashed binary string based on successive 2-bits by the ZWCs (see Table 3 ) by an HM string, and embedding the HM in front of the CM.
Stage- (1) : As the operating systems support the Unicode standard (or ASCII) to process digital texts, the MITM attackers exploit these encoding systems to process the Internet protocols. In the AITSteg, we propose a new encoding technique to change the default structure of the text processing used against MITM attacks. To meet that requirement, we employ an encoding technique on the SM letters, which is called the ''Gödel'' function (or numbering) [22] . We utilize the Gödel function to generate pairs of numbers for each letter of the SM based on its ASCII code. In the Gödel function, if η is any given number, there is a unique solution α, β. Let η be the ASCII code of the letter and α, β be the pairs of numbers that are unique for each letter of the SM.
where 2 α (2β
The equation (7) means: α is the largest number such that 2 α |(η + 1), i.e., η+1 2 α , must be odd.
For example, if η is ''z''=122, α, β can be obtained as follows. First, we obtain α by calculating the largest number such that 2 α |(122 + 1).
Then, we calculate β by using equation (8) and the obtained
The embedding algorithm computes α, β for all the letters of the SM by using equation (6) and (7). After producing α, β pairs of numbers, it converts α, β to a 6-bit binary string separately and joins them together to produce a 12-bit binary string for each letter; i.e., we used 12-bit to encode each letter because the largest α, β is equal to 0, 63 = 126, which requires 12-bit for binary representation). This coding system can support ASCII characters ranged from as many as 126 codes that include the letters of the English alphabet and some punctuation symbols. Finally, it generates an SM binary string from pairs of numbers.
Stage- (2) : In the hash function, we proposed a new formulated symmetric key based on the sending/receiving time (e.g., it can be any symmetric key based algorithm such as AES, DES, RC5, etc.), which generates a dynamic key for the same SM in different times according to the sending/receiving time and the length of SM. First, the hash function obtains the sending time as an MS_SK (e.g., ''12:15''), and then omits the 4th digit of the time and, in addition, it creates a number (e.g., ''121''), and thus, converts it to an 8-bit binary string. Further, the hash function repeats the SK binary string while the length of the SK binary string is greater than or equal to the length of the SM binary string.
Let LS be the length of the SM_binary string, and LSK be the length of the SK binary string; NC is the number of copies required for making the hash position bits.
After generating the SM binary string and the hash position bits, the hash function balances the SM binary string from the left side, and reverses the SM binary (bits) according to the hash position bits to produce the hashed SM binary.
Finally, the embedding algorithm generates a hidden message of SK (HM_SK) and an HM of the hashed SM binary by replacing each 2-bit by one ZWC based on MS_SK binary and a hashed SM binary string according to the sequence of ZWCs from the HM. Therefore, the hash function considers the receiving time as an MR_SK, and compares it with the extracted MS_SK. If it matches, the extraction algorithm reverses the hashed binary string based on the MR_SK binary and length of HM and produces an SM binary string.
Moreover, the extraction algorithm divides the SM binary string into 12-bit groups and converts each 12-bit into two 6-bit groups and calculates α, β. Thus, the hash function obtains each η according to its α, β. Finally, it generates the SM based on the η numbers.
For example, if the calculated α, β is 0, 61 , then η = 2 0 (2 × 61 + 1) − 1 = 122. After generating η for all α, β pairs of numbers, the extraction algorithm converts each η to its letter based on the ASCII standard (e.g., η = 122 ''z'').
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND COMPARISONS
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed technique in terms of the evaluation criteria. We have implemented the AITSteg in Java programming (e.g., Eclipse ADT 23.02X) and executed the experiments on various smartphones with Android OS. Moreover, we compare the experimental results with the existing techniques with respect to the evaluation criteria.
A. EVALUATION CRITERIA ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we evaluate the experimental results based on the evaluation criteria.
1) EMBEDDING CAPACITY (EC)
Since the embedding algorithm converts each letter of SM to six ZWCs to generate the CM HM , if the SMS is used as a form of communication, it provides the EC by the max number of characters in SMS (e.g., 2048 '8-bit' characters for English alphabets, and 1024 '16-bit' for UTF-8 ZWCs characters). In case of other SMAPPs, where an app is used as the means of transmission of the CM HM , the HM can be embedded by the max number of characters in the specific SMAPP. We have tested practically all the maximum text limits of SMAPPs, which are listed in Table 4 .
2) INVISIBILITY
As shown in fig. 4 , the AITSteg does not change the written symbols of CM HM after embedding the HM because the ZWCs are used to hide the SM within the CM. To analyze this criterion, we have tested the CM HM by sending it through the SMAPPS on mobile platforms such as Android, iOS, and Windows.
The experimental results showed that readers cannot detect the CM HM , and no one can infer the existence of the HM using human vision systems. Moreover, we evaluated the invisibility of the HM by sending the CM HM through the conventional SMAPPs listed in Table 5 . Based on the results conducted on the SMAPPs, thirteen SMAPPs and messengers (except for 'Telegram' and 'Twitter') supported the Unicode ZWCs and allowed transmission of the CM HM with high invisibility, so that viewers were only able to see the CM.
3) ROBUSTNESS
Basically, one of the most important criteria in steganography is the reversibility of the HM from the CM HM . To meet this measure, we considered the embedding location of HM in front of the CM due to modification of the CM HM content by attackers, which may lead to a lower probability of the HM being destroyed. Let LCM be the length of the CM; then, the LP of the HM can be obtained by using the equation (3): Thus, if a malicious user removes or alters a part of the CM HM , the HM will remain in front of the CM HM with more probability and can be extracted by the AITSteg technique. During data transmission, the MITM attackers can monitor ZWCs through CM HM and may try to discover/decode the confidential information. Because an encoding function and a dynamic symmetric key is applied for each SM, it is very 
4) SECURITY
Since the AITSteg provides optimum balance between three other criteria -higher EC, high imperceptibility, and high robustness -it is able to perfectly secure the SM. Therefore, the eavesdropper (attacker) cannot decode or even discover the hidden information from the CM HM , but he/she may try to decode the ZWCs from the CM HM . It is assumed that the algorithm is not available to attackers, and he/she only has access to CM HM . For a situation where an attacker compromises the victim's device since we defined a tricky feature that hides the AITSteg app in the Android OS, and the user must only run it by calling a number (e.g., '' * 110110''). Hence, the attacker cannot access to the AITSteg app.
Let NS be the length of the SM binary string, NZ (e.g., NS/2 is the number of ZWCs that are used to generate the HM; thus, DP is the decoding probability of the correct guess of the Hashed SM binary that can be obtained by equation (4) .
For example: as depicted in Table 6 , the AITSteg converts SM=''Ali'' to an SM binary string that containing NS = (3 × 12) + 8 = 44 and generates the hash position bits according to the SK as follows: if (LS=length (SM)=3, SK=''12:13'' = 121, SK_binary = ''1111001'', LSK = Length (SK_binary)=7, then, NC = 3×12 7 + 1 = 6. An NC times copy of the SK binary is used to generate the hash position bits. Thus, the hash function reverses the SM binary string according to the hash position bits. Finally, the embedding algorithm replaces each 2-bit in the hashed SM binary by one ZWC based on Table 3 . Finally, it generates an HM which includes ''22'' ZWCs, and inserts the HM in front of the CM.
Herein, the DP is the probability of decoding the hashed binary string; still, there are two encoding techniques that generate dynamic ZWCs even for the same SM in different sending/receiving times. In practice, it is impossible to decode the original SM without having the hash function and formulated symmetric keys. The probability distribution of DP regarding the number of characters of SM and CM is illustrated in Fig. 5 . 
B. COMPARISON RESULTS
In what follows, we compare the AITSteg with the existing UniSpaCh [7] , AH4S [9] , TWSM [10] , and emoticonbased [12] techniques with respect to the evaluation criteria. These techniques are chosen for comparison because they are the only techniques that apply Unicode characters to hide confidential information in digital text.
For fair comparison, first, we implemented the existing techniques on the highlighted examples shown in Table 7  and Table 3 . We then rated the evaluation results for each technique with respect to the EC, invisibility, and robustness: for example, low and high scale for the EC; imperceptible and visible for invisibility; and low, modest, and high for robustness. In addition, we have outlined the security highlights and limitations of the evaluated techniques according to three evaluation criteria. Let us assume that we want to hide an SM = ''Ali'' using a CM = ''How are you?''; and if we utilize the existing techniques to hide the SM in the CM, the evaluated results conducted on the CM HM of each technique are as shown in Table 7 . We have to observe that the comparison is carried out by considering a minimum word length of three characters. We highlighted special spaces to show the text trace in the CM HM , but in practice, they have a transparent text trace (no color). Table 7 shows the embedding features of the AITSteg and existing techniques, and Table 8 summarizes the EC and DR results produced by the AITSteg that are obtained from the highlighted messages (e.g., SM and CM). For fair comparison, we normalized the EC results of each method based on the number of embeddable characters per message by considering an 8-bit binary for each character of SM. Moreover, because the AH4S [9] generates an unknown CM for embedding the SM, we omitted it during the evaluation process.
To rate the criteria, we evaluated the EC of each technique based on the EL and the BPL (e.g., the number of embeddable bits or character per locations) using equation (1) . As illustrated in the Fig. 6 , the AITSteg exhibits a higher EC compared to those of the others on the same cover messages. For invisibility, we analyzed each technique by considering the embedding trace through the CM. Moreover, we obtained the DR of each technique using equation (2) .
From Table 7 and 8, it can be observed that the AITSteg requires the lowest number of cover characters to embed a secret character for all of the HM.
Moreover, when compared with other bit-level embedding techniques, the AITSteg stands best by inserting a secret character in only one location, while the other techniques require a minimum of four locations. In addition, when we compare the AITSteg with character-level techniques, it is obvious that the proposed technique achieves a higher EC, high invisibility, and high robustness. This means that the AITSteg provides greater efficiency by considering optimum trade-offs between criteria. To evaluate the proposed technique, we compare some of the benefits and limitations of the AITSteg with those of the existing techniques, as shown in Table 9 . 
C. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
This subsection discusses the AITSteg in various aspects such as mutual verification, key management, and prevention against attacks. Is the SK Safely stored? Since the attacker does not know the detailed structure of the encoding functions such as the Gödel function, hash function and symmetric key algorithm, he/she can discover neither the correct pairs of numbers nor the original SM. Moreover, because the SK is hidden by the CM HM on the database server, it is almost impossible to extract the SK for the attackers. Is there any alternative to decoding the HM? Since an attacker only knows the CM HM (using conventional approaches, although encoding functions and the SK are still unknown), the security of the proposed technique cannot be broken. Therefore, the AITSteg is perfectly secure.
1) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION BETWEEN MS AND MR
In the scenario of the AITSteg technique, the MR verifies the SM integrity by using the SK and checks the identity of the MS from the CM HM . When the MR receives a CM HM , it extracts the SK MS (e.g., the SK for MS) from the ZWCs and calculates the formulated SK MR from the receiving time and compares it with the SK MS . If it matches, then the authentication of the SM is performed by the MR, and moreover, it extracts the original SM; otherwise, the extraction algorithm will display the following message: ''you cannot access the hidden information!'' This certifies the mutual authentication between the MS and the MR through SMAPPs (or network).
2) KEY MANAGEMENT
The AITSteg technique provides efficient control of the key management issue on both sides of the algorithm (MS and MR), where the SK MS is securely communicated by the SMAPPs to the MR. Therefore, this technique successfully hides the confidential information before its transmission over the SMAPPs. Because low-processing smartphones are in use, we employed a symmetric key algorithm to optimize the efficiency of the proposed technique, as it is 1000 times faster than the asymmetric algorithms [1] .
3) PREVENTION AGAINST ATTACKS
In this subsection, we show that the AITSteg technique is able to prevent the transmitted HM from various attacks over the SMAPPs or even the network. Let us assume that the encoding functions are not available and are securely protected. Obtaining any secret key SK is not feasible because it has been transmitted in an imperceptible way through the CM HM and is always compared with the formulated receiving time when required.
• Message Disclosure and OTA Attacks: The AITSteg provides end-to-end security for confidential information from the MS to the MR consisting of an OTA interface with a combination of encoding and text hiding algorithms. The proposed technique does not depend on the default encryption algorithm (e.g., A5/1, A5/2), which exists between the mobile station and BTS in cellular networks. Moreover, it is utilized to provide end-to-end confidentiality to the transmitted secret message in the SMAPPs. Therefore, the encoding system and hidden trace of the HM protect the transmitted CM HM from message disclosure attack.
• Man-in-the-middle Attack: the AITSteg employs a dynamic symmetric key algorithm to create a hash function for encoding/decoding the hidden information transmission between the MS and the MR; i.e., it generates various hashed SM binaries or ZWCs for the same secret information at different times. The HM is securely encoded/decoded with an SK for every subsequent verification and since the attacker does not have sufficient information to reproduce the SK, it prevents the transmission from the MITM attack over the network.
• Manipulation by Readers (MBR): If the CM HM is transmitted through the SMAPPs, the AITSteg still provides end-to-end security to the MR/MS; where it prevents the HM from being discovered by the SPOs as well as attackers who are monitoring conversations on the SMAPPs.
V. FORMAL PROOF OF PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
To clear the security analysis statement, we utilize the BAN Logic symbols to formally prove the authentication process of the AITSteg. (1) P| ≡ X :P believes X, (2) P X : P sees X. The MS has sent a CM HM (HM + CM) including X to P, who can discover/read/repeat X (possibly after doing decoding), (3) P|∼X :P once said X. P at some time sent a CM HM containing the statement X, (4)P|⇒X :P has jurisdiction over X. P is an authority on X and should be trusted on this matter, (5) #(X ) : the formula X is fresh, which is, X has not been sent in a CM HM at any time before the current run of the technique, (6) P K ↔ Q : P and Q may use the shared key K to communicate, (7)
The formula X is a secret known only to P and Q, (8) {X } K : The formula X is encrypted under the key K [23] . As illustrated in Fig. 7 (5) Resistance to MITM Attack: Since the MITM attacker knows neither the SK MS /SK MR nor the hash function, it prevents the confidential information from being discovered.
(6) Resistance to MBR Attack: As we have already proved in section (IV), if an MBR manipulates the CM HM , the HM will remain at the front of the CM HM with high probability. Thus, it prevents the HM from being visually detected.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study proposes a novel text steganography technique called AITSteg for hidden transmission of text message via SMS or social media between smartphone users. The proposed technique is able to hide large capacity secret information inside a short cover message so that the embedding trace is totally invisible to viewers. In addition, a combination of mathematical encoding and symmetric key algorithms is introduced that generates various secret bits even for the same confidential information in different times and keeps it VOLUME 6, 2018 perfectly secure against attacks. The analysis of the AITSteg technique confirms that it is able to prevent various attacks. Moreover, it provides higher EC, invisibility, and robustness compared to the existing techniques. In the best case scenario, the AITSteg provides optimum trade-offs between evaluation criteria, offering a certain level of safety for the hidden conversation via conventional social media or messengers.
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